I
In  the British army had no real operational doctrine, except to take the offensive in almost all circumstances. Senior officers expected that their forces would experience heavy losses, but hoped to win by combining mobility with high morale. As both sides could generate equally devastating firepower, this last factor would be crucial in distinguishing victor and vanquished.$ The army's Field service regulations placed little emphasis on the need to produce a combined-arms fire plan. The role of artillery was merely to act as an adjunct to the infantry. It was to pave the way for their attack rather than to neutralize the defenders' fire by covering their advance until the last possible moment. However, the heavy losses their troops sustained between  and  disabused commanders of many of these ideas. By - they had come to rely upon the intelligent combination of all arms to overwhelm the defenders by weight of firepower. Artillery was the dominant arm. The range of the artillery, its ability to destroy or neutralize German machine guns and artillery, and to flatten barbed wire, fixed the speed and distance of an advance. The success of operations at Cambrai in November , Hamel in July , and Amiens in August  depended to a great extent upon a veritable revolution in artillery techniques. Better maps, accurate calibration of their weapons, and the systematic collection of meteorological information made it feasible for the and organisation ', Haig insisted, ' elaborated before the war have stood the test imposed upon them and are sound. ') But the self-congratulatory and complacent tone of Haig's valediction was not universally shared. Some senior officers did believe that pre-war doctrine required modification. As early as July , with the Somme offensive barely three weeks old, the CIGS, Sir William Robertson, wrote to Sir Henry Rawlinson, whose th Army was bearing the brunt of the offensive, that
As you know better than I do each war has its own peculiarities, but one would think that no war was ever so peculiar as the present one, and Field Service Regulations will require a tremendous amount of revising when we have finished with the Boche. Principles, as we used to call them, are good and cannot be disregarded, but their application is a very difficult business, and I think that we still take these principles too literally.* And in a lecture that he gave in December , Maj.-Gen. Sir Louis Jackson, formerly director of Trench warfare at the war office, suggested that operations could be transformed if the army organized the whole of its transport on the basis of trucks and carried its infantry, artillery, and engineers in caterpillar tractors and cross-country trucks capable of transporting them swiftly and safely across the battlefield."! It was these kinds of insights that dominated the post-war development of British doctrine, not Haig's conservatism.
The war ended before Ware's plan could be put into operation. But the general staff had learnt two lessons. Military power was no longer based simply upon manpower. It had to take account of machine power and machine power could compensate for the fact that the British army was small by continental standards. Britain needed a small, well-equipped, highly mobile army, organized around the principle that technology should be used to minimize human casualties. As Adjt.-Gen., Sir Robert Whigham, explained in , he favoured mechanization ' because our little regular army has got to be organised and trained in peace in order that we may produce an expeditionary force numerically small but perhaps, we hope, highly trained and equipped with thoroughly up-to-date material on the outbreak of war '."" The British army was not slow to begin to analyse its wartime experiences, and nor did it give the task such a low priority that it left it to junior officers. In November , a year before von Seeckt began a similar policy in Germany, the British started to glean the lessons of the war. Committees of senior officers were established to make recommendations on the structure and organization of the post-war army, the staff, the main arms of service, and to re-write the Field service regulations (FSR) and the various arm-of-service manuals."# Like the Germans, the British looked far and wide for evidence and information. In November  Wilson established a committee under a former Director of Staff Duties (DSD), Sir William Bird, ' to look at war through that window twenty years hence ' and to make recommendations on the composition of divisions, corps, and army troops in the post-war army."$ (Bird was perhaps not the ideal officer to chair such a committee. In  he published a study of strategy in which he showed himself to be a master of considerable historical knowledge but very reluctant to speculate about future developments.)"% The Bird committee included amongst its members senior officers from the Australian, New Zealand, Indian, and South African forces and from the GHQs of the BEF and the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. It gathered evidence not only from senior staff officers at GHQ in France and from Haig's army commanders, but also from most of his corps commanders and many divisional commanders. It distributed , questionnaires (although not all were returned) and examined  witnesses."& In December  a committee under Lt.-Gen. Sir Walter Braithwaite began to gather evidence about the working of the staff. Braithwaite was a highly experienced officer. He had served as commandant of the staff college at Quetta before the war, as Sir Ian Hamilton's chief of staff at Gallipoli, and as a divisional and corps commander in France. He was assisted by two major-generals and they gleaned evidence from no fewer than eighty-four senior commanders and staff officers in France. In addition the war office collected evidence of the working of the staff from the commanders-in-chief in Egypt, Italy, Mesopotamia, East Africa, India, and Salonika, each of whom consulted their own senior subordinates before replying."' The army council gave such a high priority to the future organization of the engineers and infantry that in January  they gave the task of making recommendations about them to committees chaired by two of Haig's army commanders, Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Julian Byng. In investigating the future of the royal engineers in the light of wartime experience, Rawlinson was assisted by no fewer than five major-generals. His committee issued a seven-page questionnaire, took oral evidence from ninetytwo witnesses, and written evidence from another eighteen."( Nor was the preparation of doctrinal manuals left in the hands of inexperienced junior officers. Manuals had multiple authors. The ultimate responsibility for preparing them lay with the DSD at the war office. Each of the DSDs who supervised the preparation of the three editions of FSR that appeared between  and , Maj.-Gens. Sir A. Lynden-Bell, C. F. Romer, and C. Bonham-Carter, were staff college graduates and had extensive experience of operations on the Western front. Romer, for example, had commanded a division and Bonham-Carter had served as a brigadier on the general staff at GHQ. They allocated the day-to-day management of the project to one of their senior subordinates, who in turn either commissioned an officer from outside the war office to prepare the first draft, delegated the task to the relevant arm-of-service school, or perhaps did the job himself. The initial draft of the first post-war edition of Infantry training was, for example, prepared by brigadier Winston Dugan, who had formerly been the assistant inspectorgeneral of training in France. Liddell Hart acted as his assistant.") Lt.-Col. Lord Gort prepared the first draft of the revised edition that appeared in , and Lt.-Col. B. L. Montgomery followed suit in ."* Brig.-Gen. Aspinall, another of Hamilton's former chiefs of staff, prepared the initial draft of the first post-war edition of FSR, which appeared in , and nine years later Maj.-Gen. C. P. Deedes, then commanding a territorial army infantry division, prepared the first draft of the  edition.#! The first draft of each manual was circulated widely. Each relevant branch of the war office, the general officers commanding-in-chief (GOC-in-Cs) of all of the home commands, the commandant and staff of the staff college and, if it was an arm-of-service manual, the relevant army school, were invited to comment and suggest amendments.#" In , for example, a special committee under Maj.-Gen. G. P. Dawnay, who had served on Hamilton's staff at Gallipoli, decided that a chapter on combined operations prepared by Sir Hastings Anderson, the commandant of the staff college, should not be inserted into FSR but should be sent to the admiralty for inclusion in a new manual on combined operations.## Gort's edition of Infantry training was vetted by the director of military training at the war office, the senior officers school, the staff college and all of the home commands, and he was made to change at least one section at the insistence of the CIGS and the DSD.#$ Only after all such comments and suggestions had been considered, incorporated, or rejected was a manual published.#% The end product often bore little relationship to the first draft for ' by the time the draft had passed through the barrage of multifarious hands, or rather blue pencils, at the War Office, the Staff College, and the Commands, the author is fortunate if he can recognise his own handiwork '.#&
II
The most important fruits of the general staff 's collective labours were the three editions of FSR that were published in the s. The first post-war edition appeared in , the second in  and the final one in . A comparison between the  manual and its post-war successors demonstrates just how far British doctrine shifted in the decade after .
FSR ( ) was a theoretical treatise about the operational and tactical conduct of land warfare. Its authors were the products of a society convinced that human beings, through the application of rational analysis, could understand and control the natural world.#' They believed that they could emulate the engineers and scientists who had transformed the natural world in the late nineteenth century, and, by the application of reason, bring order to the battlefield. But whereas the hypotheses of scientists and engineers could be founded upon experimentation, their hypotheses rested upon history. Pre-war operational doctrine was based upon a four-fold model of battle derived from the general staff 's understanding of Napoleonic warfare and the British army's experience of colonial warfare.#( From them, they learnt that ' Decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive. '#) In the first stage of each battle the opposing armies manoeuvred against each other to seize some topographical advantage. In the second phase, they sought to weaken their opponent through ' wearing-out ' operations and at the same time massed their own reserves. In the third stage one side or the other mounted a decisive attack to break through the enemy's line and compel him to withdraw. And in the final phase, the victor pursued the vanquished with the utmost vigour in order to destroy his army.#* FSR ( ) placed comparatively little emphasis on the need for combined arms operations. It asserted that the infantry was the dominant arm, and that the other arms -the cavalry, artillery, and engineers -largely existed to act as their servants. Their tasks were to pave the way for the decisive attack that the infantry would deliver with their bayonets and, in the case of the cavalry, to garner the fruits of their victory by pursuing the defeated enemy forces. Firepower alone could not encompass the enemy's defeat and ' To drive an enemy from the field, assault, or the immediate threat of it, is almost always necessary. '$! Superior numbers, organization, and training were important. But a bayonet assault in the face of modern weapons demanded the highest possible morale on the part of the assailants, and so ultimately ' offensive spirit ', the determination to close with the enemy whatever the cost, would determine the winner and looser. As Tim Travers has argued, before  the general staff sought ' human solutions to modern firepower '.$" The experience of - brutally demonstrated the full cost of implementing this doctrine. But it did not cause the general staff to abandon its belief that the conduct of battle could and should be subject to rational analysis and guidance. Unlike the Germans they did not recognize that battles were invariably chaotic, that senior commanders could only hope to exercise a limited influence over their troops, and that it was imperative to develop a doctrine that devolved command downwards.$# FSR ( ) had posited that order could be derived from the chaos of battle by the application of the ' Principles of War ', but had then refrained from defining them. Post-war doctrine tried to increase a commander's control over his troops by making more explicit the intellectual framework within which all parts of the army should operate. None of the three editions of FSR published in the s agreed on precisely the same list of principles and placed them in exactly the same order, but each was posited on the assumption that success on the battlefield depended on commanders implementing them with intelligence and discrimination. They must never be deflected from their main objective, which was the destruction of the enemy's army on the battlefield. Whilst they had at all times to ensure the security of their own forces against attack, they had to remember that victory could only be secured by taking the offensive. Success depended upon concentrating force at the decisive point, economizing it elsewhere, and employing surprise to multiply the impact of the offensive. The ability to take the offensive and to achieve surprise and concentration of force at the decisive point in turn depended upon the ability of the commander to render his force mobile and to ensure that all arms of the service worked in the closest possible co-operation.$$ These were highly generalized principles, but too much should not be made of the fact that British doctrine was bound to be confused in the s because the British army had no clearly defined enemy against which to prepare. The general staff thought that one doctrine could cover all cases. In  the earl of Cavan, the CIGS between  and , told senior officers that ' The present policy is to train for a small war against 
See also J. Alger, The quest for victory : the history of the principles of war (Westport, CT, ).
an enemy whose armament is on an equality with our own. '$% FSR ( ) stated explicitly that ' The instructions laid down herein cover a war of the first magnitude, but can be modified in their application to other forms of warfare. '$& The post-war FSRs did not completely renege on the pre-war insistence on the importance of high morale, but they no longer afforded it quite the same centrality it had enjoyed in FSR ( ). The appalling losses suffered by the infantry in the battles of - showed the general staff that high morale and the bayonet would not by themselves bring victory. In addition to ' the offensive spirit ', between  and  the BEF had developed a combined arms practice that involved the use of artillery, aircraft, machine guns, mortars, and automatic rifles working in co-operation to kill or neutralize the defenders so that the infantry could advance without incurring prohibitive losses. The post-war editions of FSR tried to codify this practice. As FSR ( ) asserted
In all operations there must, in addition, be close co-operation between all arms and services engaged, the task of supporting arms being to prepare the attack and to give the strongest possible support throughout every stage of the action to the attacking infantry, who alone can complete the victory by destroying the last remnants of hostile resistance. Infantry cannot advance against even semi-organised resistance unless that resistance is kept under subjection by firepower.$'
Or, as the commandant of the staff college put it more succinctly in , ' The keynote of modern tactics is the development of the combined fire plan to provide continuous covering fire for the attacking troops. ' $(
After  the main issue that FSR tried to elucidate was how to effect that combination in such a way as to maximize the possibility of victory and minimize the number of casualties it cost. The general staff developed an intellectual and a material solution to this problem. If troops blasted away indiscriminately at the enemy they would only waste scarce ammunition. What was required was careful discrimination to ensure that firepower was directed at particular targets at the moment when it would be most efficacious. The experience of the war seemed to demonstrate that the necessary co-operation between the leading troops and their supporting weapons could only be secured if unity of control prevailed. Planning was, therefore, one key to the problem of how to restore mobility to the battlefield. Only by careful planning could the fire of supporting weapons be co-ordinated with the motion of troops across the battlefield. Commanders at all levels were, therefore, enjoined to produce a ' master plan ' to co-ordinate the actions of their subordinates, and the latter were required to adhere to it in both letter and spirit.$)
Parallel to the adoption of what was essentially a bureaucratic solution to the problem of securing combined arms co-ordination was the general staff 's $% Report on the staff exercises held by the CIGS,  Oct.- Nov. , PRO WO \.
enthusiastic commitment to waging war using the most modern technologies. By - the army had demonstrated its faith in technological solutions to operational and tactical problems by creating the world's largest airforce, by being the first army in the world to mount a massed tank attack, and by its growing belief in the overriding importance of scientific gunnery.$* Many of the doctrinal developments incorporated into the post-war FSRs were the product of the general staff 's efforts to understand how new technologies would influence operations. This process of incorporation began in the early s. FSR ( ) only identified two kinds of offensive battle, an ' encounter attack ' mounted against an unorganized defence and a ' deliberate attack ', mounted against an opponent securely entrenched behind prepared defences.%! This changed as a result of experiments that were conducted at Aldershot in the early s carried out at the behest of Wilson, and of staff exercises conducted by Cavan in  and . Wilson believed that ' with the advent of aeroplanes, of wireless, of Tanks, of cross country traction, of gas, of smoke, etc. etc. the army will be passing through something of a revolution in its preparations for war, and other things being equal that Army will win which is most in advance of its times and which has most surprises in store for the enemy '.%" In November  the army council decided to establish an experimental brigade at Aldershot, although demobilization and current troop commitments delayed its formation until . Wilson wanted to use it for ' looking around the corner ' : in other words trying to decide what the division of the future is to consist of. His thesis is that if in  we had had the division gunned, machine-gunned, gassed and aeroplaned [sic] as it was in  we could have gone to the Rhine, and if that be so it is our business to think out the division that will be equally superior and powerful in the next war.%# Almost at the same time it was assembling, the DSD, at the behest of the directing staff of the staff college, was preparing pamphlets on the use of tanks, smoke, gas, aircraft, and machine guns in open warfare. As soon as Wilson's deputy, Sir Philip Chetwode, discovered this he stopped it. Officers had a great deal of experience of trench warfare, but ' no man in Europe or elsewhere has had any real experience of open warfare on a large scale and above all in which all the new weapons and appliances have been used, and, still more important, no experience in which both sides have had the advantage of them '.%$ He wanted the staff college to act as a think-tank to work out theoretical answers that could then be passed on to the experimental brigade for testing on the ground. The students were required to ' consider and discuss the various problems of tactics, organization, etc., arising out of the development of armaments and other lessons from the war of - '.%% Syndicates of students wrote lengthy essays at the end of their course ' about our ideas on the future conduct of war ' in the light of weapons which might be available to the army in ten or fifteen years time. The GOC-in-Cs of the home commands were also asked to submit questions they wished the brigade to investigate.%& The result was that the brigade was presented with an ambitious programme outlined in a brochure of fifty-one typed pages dealing with every conceivable tactical and operational scenario. It was planned to narrow these down at a general staff conference in the spring of , but ' the strike intervened ', nothing was done, and ' the Experimental Brigade had to work out its own salvation and, as some-one [sic] has said, the great experiment of  was to find out what the Experimental Brigade was to experiment about '.%' In fact in  the brigade concentrated on the handling of the new arms, and, in particular, tanks, aircraft, pack artillery used as a close support weapon, and signals.%( In its first season its efforts were directed towards three objectives, how to make the infantry more mobile, how to make them secure against tanks, and how to use tanks against an enemy that also possessed tanks. It concluded that the only way to improve the mobility of the infantry was to lighten the load each man carried by providing units with more transport. Tank protection could be afforded by the careful siting of units in tank-proof localities. But that alone would not suffice because the exercises also demonstrated the helplessness of infantry that lacked their own anti-tank weapons when they were attacked by tanks. Every unit, therefore, needed its own organic anti-tank weapons and specifications were issued to produce two types of anti-tank machine gun. But even if they were adopted, the tanks would, according to the commander of one of the tank companies that took part in the exercises, still enjoy considerable immunity because of their speed.%)
Cavan shared Wilson's determination to continue to experiment to produce an army capable of mobile combined arms action. He was justifiably angered when Sir Ian Hamilton accused the army of still being addicted to the ' cult of the bayonet '.%* He wanted to adjust the combined arms lessons of the war to the problems of mobile warfare. In  the work of the Aldershot brigade continued. It confirmed the essential soundness of the army's combined arms doctrine but it also highlighted the need for lighter and more mobile weapons, for more mechanical transport, and for the wider employment of wireless if troops were to be able to conduct mobile operations in the future.&! Cavan was unable to scale up these experiments and to conduct large-scale field exercises because of the exiguous state of the army at home. Instead, in October and November  and in April  he held major staff exercises to consider the problems likely to arise in mobile encounter battles in which both sides employed the most modern weapons. They suggested, amongst other things, that because of the danger that advancing columns would be spotted from the air, commanders seeking to achieve surprise would have to resort to night operations.&" Many of these lessons quickly appeared in the  edition of FSR. Not only did it devote more space than its predecessor to the conduct of ' the encounter attack ', but it also included a completely new chapter on ' Night Operations '.&# Furthermore, the  edition had done little more than codify the defensive doctrine that the BEF had attempted to apply in the spring of . But the  edition abandoned the terminology of trench warfare completely and emphasized instead the importance of counter-attacks mounted by especially prepared reserves to drive the enemy back.&$
III
The general staff 's determination to restore mobility to the battlefield was also reflected in its policies on organization and weapons development. The -model division had possessed a plethora of rifles and direct fire weapons, but only sixteen indirect fire weapons, in the shape of a single brigade of field howitzers. It was an organization which was well suited to carry out an attack according to pre-war doctrine which ' was speaking generally carried out with two weapons -the rifle and the gun. There was little in the nature of an organised fire plan. The tendency was to treat artillery fire as preparing the way for attack rather than covering it to the last possible moment. '&% The war demonstrated the shortcomings of both the doctrine and the organization. The infantry required close and continuous fire support during every stage of the attack if they were to advance, and by  the army had evolved a divisional organization amply equipped with field guns, howitzers, and light and medium trench mortars that could provide it. The Bird committee wanted to base the organization of post-war divisions on a modified version of the -model division. In doing so they would have doubled the ratio of support weapons to infantrymen compared to what it had been in . But their recommendations were rejected. Not only would they be far too expensive, but they also required the provision of far too many specialist units like trench mortar battalions. Throughout the interwar period all attempts to reform the structure of the army had to take account of the fact that its most immediate mission was to work within the constraints of the Cardwell system to produce sufficient infantry battalions to garrison the empire. Furthermore, the wholesale adoption of the ' Bird ' division would have nullified the pursuit of one of the army's other prime goals. It could certainly have generated tremendous firepower, but at the expense of movement. Occupying, as it would have done, over sixteen miles of road, the ' Bird ' division threatened to be dangerously immobile.&&
In  the general staff finally fixed upon a new organization for the postwar division, based largely on the recommendations of the Aldershot experimental brigade and designed to meet the constraints imposed upon the army by the need to garrison the empire. The brigade had operated under the instructions of the GOC-in-C Aldershot, Sir Thomas Moreland. Moreland believed that ' The military machine when equipped with only essential weapons is already sufficiently complicated and we should cut out unessentials [sic] . '&' Despite the fact that in peacetime units were usually scattered in isolated garrisons, he insisted on retaining the division as the basic tactical formation, and strongly deprecated the formation of permanent brigade groups on the grounds that they would dissipate the power of the artillery. All arms, including the infantry, had to be made more mobile, and so he recommended that the infantry should forgo their light stokes mortars and the artillery their medium and heavy trench mortars. Mobile medium howitzers could perform the task of the latter just as well and the problem of providing close support for the infantry could be met by giving each brigade a battery of pack howitzers.&( Most of Moreland's recommendations were accepted and they formed the basis of the -model infantry division. It consisted of twelve infantry battalions, divided into three brigades, supported by three brigades of artillery. Each of the latter consisted of three batteries of field guns and one battery of light howitzers. It also had a brigade of pack artillery, one of whose three batteries was attached to each infantry brigade.&) It was a compromise organization. It reflected the constraints of the Cardwell system and the need to provide imperial garrisons on the one hand, and the quest for mobility on the other. But it did so at the expense of meeting the demands of a doctrine that called for formations to be able to generate overwhelming firepower. It did provide the infantry with a far higher proportion of direct-fire weapons than they had in  (one machine gun to twenty-eight riflemen and one lewis gun to eight riflemen, compared to only one machine gun to  riflemen in ). But it gave them only enough artillery to cover the attack of two of their twelve infantry battalions, hardly more support than they had enjoyed before the war.&* The post-war emphasis on greater mobility and firepower also encouraged the war office to begin development of a new generation of weapons and transport better suited to its emerging doctrine. In  the war office decided that all divisional supply trains should be completely mechanized and the royal army service corps began to develop six-wheel lorries fitted with large pneumatic tyres that had a much improved cross-country performance compared to existing vehicles fitted with solid tyres. Almost simultaneously, the royal tank corps, which had been placed on a permanent footing in September , acquired its first Vickers medium tanks, and in - the first two field artillery brigades were also mechanized.'! In  and  Milne established a new directorate of mechanization at the war office and set up the mechanical warfare board. They were charged with overseeing the development of new weapons by bringing together representatives of all departments and arms of the service, academics, and industrialists concerned with mechanization.'" The crucial factor preventing these developments from going faster and being taken further in the s was not so much any innate conservatism at the very top of the army, but the shortage of funds. That meant that, apart from some new tanks and gas masks, little new equipment actually reached the troops in the s. The limited money available was devoted to experiments and the production of prototypes. This was done in the expectation that when sufficient funds were made available, the army would at least have suitable designs to put into production.
In the mid-s Cavan did conduct field trials with the new equipment that was available. They highlighted three important issues, the extreme vulnerability of infantry that had no anti-tank weapons to tank attack, the impossibility of mixing horse and mechanical transport in the same unit or formation because of their very different speeds, and the need for faster means of communication. The infantry had to have their own mobile anti-tank guns, and the first-line transport that actually accompanied battalions into battle had to be mechanized. In  Cavan, in an attempt to hasten the tempo of operations by substituting wireless communications for cable, had abolished the use of cable forward of corps HQs except for the artillery. But by September  too few wireless sets and even fewer trained operators were available. The result was that in the autumn manoeuvres, the largest conducted by the army in the s, both sides not only lost contact with the ' enemy ', but commanders also lost contact with their own forces. The outcome was another valuable lesson that was incorporated into the army's written doctrine. The  edition of FSR contained a completely new chapter on communications.
To quicken the speed of communications without simultaneously creating a brittle system prone to breakdown, signallers were expected to rely upon a mixture of cable, wireless, despatch riders, and aeroplanes to reduce their dependence on one single form of communication. Within divisions, commanders were told to reduce their dependence on vulnerable electronic means of communication by placing their headquarters close enough to the front that they could intervene in person if necessary.'$ Milne carried on Cavan's policy of research and experimentation after he became CIGS in .'% Milne believed just as strongly as his predecessors that battles were won by combined arms action and the generation of overwhelming firepower using the latest technologies.'& In May  he told an audience of senior officers that FSR ( )'s insistence that ' Infantry is the arms which in the end wins battles. ' I am afraid I cannot agree. No arm wins battles and I want that to be clearly understood. It is the co-operation of all necessary arms that wins battles and that is your basis for training for the future. I want that to be your principle in training -combination and co-operation of arms.''
Critics like Fuller and Liddell Hart who suggested that Milne's decision in late  -to disband the experimental armoured force he had created in  and to turn towards the mechanization of the infantry -represented some kind of loss of nerve on his part, are mistaken.'( Milne never embraced the all-tank ideal of some of the royal tank corps radicals. By  the work of the Aldershot brigade and the staff exercises and manoeuvres of  and  had shown that a modern army could not be created simply by adding mechanical devices and even whole units to existing formations. What was needed, if further experiments were to be of any value, was what he called a ' mechanical formation, in its embryo state ' as the next step towards a wholesale reorganization of the army to create ' a simple and flexible instrument permitting of protected mobility from which offensive power can be rapidly The results of the experiments conducted by the work of the experimental mechanized force in  (renamed the experimental armoured force in ) were incorporated into the  edition of FSR.'* It was the first manual to discuss explicitly ' Armoured units ' and to include a detailed analysis of their weaknesses, strengths, and functions. It asserted that they could be employed either to break through the enemy's defences, or, by outflanking it, attack its lines of communication and headquarters. In conformity with the general staff 's commitment to combined arms action, it insisted that tanks alone could not overcome a properly entrenched enemy, and if they were used in a frontal attack they had to have the support of artillery to neutralize the enemy's batteries and infantry to overcome its anti-tank guns and to consolidate their gains.(! The general staff also issued two other manuals before the Kirke report that considered the future role of tanks and mechanization, Mechanized and armoured formations ( ) and Modern formations ( ). The latter postulated that in the future the army might consist of four basic types of brigade, infantry brigades, cavalry brigades, light armoured brigades, and mixed armoured brigades, and that they could be combined into divisional-sized formations. Depending upon the terrain over which it was fighting and its mission, an infantry division might consist entirely of infantry troops and supporting arms or it might have a mixed armoured brigade (consisting of light and medium tanks) attached to it. Mobile divisions might consist of either a cavalry brigade or an infantry brigade in buses and two mixed armoured brigades. Both types of division would also include engineers, artillery, and either light tanks or cavalry tanks for reconnaissance.(" It is, therefore, erroneous to conclude that the army waited until the establishment of the Kirke committee in  to learn the ' lessons ' of the First World War. It had abandoned its pre- quest for a ' human-centred ' solution to the problem of overcoming the firepower of the modern battlefield over a decade before the committee was established. It had enthusiastically embraced a technological solution and was experimenting with ways to give it effect. The Kirke committee, therefore, did not mark a radical new beginning. Rather, it endorsed the post-war doctrine that combined arms action and overwhelming firepower were essential if mobility was to be restored to the battlefield. What it did that was new was to highlight the fact that so far the army had not discovered a means of transforming a ' break-in ' into a ' breakthrough ' and suggested that the best way to do so would be to accelerate ') Ibid., pp. , . '* The work of the experimental armoured force is discussed in Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, current developments. A smaller and more flexible division, with a greater proportion of tanks, artillery, and motor transport was required, and more efforts had to be made to achieve surprise, either through the use of smoke or night operations.(# Most of these recommendations were implemented in the second half of the s.
IV
In the s the only kind of active service that the British army experienced involved colonial policing and conducting minor wars on the frontiers of the empire. However, in preparing its formal written doctrine the general staff was not either insular or imperial in its outlook, although in matters of organization its freedom of action was seriously constrained by the demands of the Cardwell system. It did not turn its back on the problems of how to fight a modern war against a first-class power, and nor did it require the Kirke committee's report to force it to begin to garner the lessons of the First World War. Its FSRs were regularly up-dated in the light of the lessons of the Great War and peacetime experiments and manoeuvres. Weapons design and development continued apace, but within the confines of a tightly restricted budget. It was with some justification that, in , a former director of military operations, Sir Frederick Maurice, wrote in his semi-official textbook, British strategy : a study of the application of the principles of war that ' it is we who are leading the way to the recreation of the mobile striking force '.($ However, the fact remains that the army's ability successfully to practise mechanized, mobile, warfare in the first half of the Second World War was so limited as to cast doubts on the fact that it had learnt very much at all. Some of the reasons for this have been explored by other authors and need only be mentioned here.(% The very outspokenness and lack of tact of some of the semiofficial spokesmen for mechanization, such as Liddell Hart and Fuller, aroused the resentment of many officers and caused them to look with suspicion at what they were proposing. Many cavalry officers feared, with some justification, that the royal tank corps hoped to expand at their expense. Financial constraints imposed on the army by the Treasury and successive governments anxious to produce a balanced budget precluded the large-scale purchase of new equipment. Realistic training was impeded by shortages of manpower and land. But other factors were at least as important, although less apparent at the time, and have often gone unnoticed since.
One reason why the German army was able to exploit the advantages of mechanization to the utmost was because of its willingness to practise Auftragstaktik. Subordinate commanders were given a mission but were permitted wide latitude to perform it within the ambit of their commander's 
